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A GENESIS OF CONFLICT:
THE ZERO-SUM MINDSET
Jonathan R. Cohen*
ABSTRACT
Parties in conflict often operate under the assumption that for one
party to win, the other party must lose.  This concept, known as the
“zero-sum mindset,” can lead to undesirable results, both because it
can make disputes harder to resolve and because people holding
such beliefs are more likely to get into conflicts to begin with.  Over
the past several decades, legal educators specializing in dispute reso-
lution have worked hard to challenge that mindset.  This task is not
simple, for framing conflict in zero-sum terms has very deep cultural
roots tracing back at least to the Biblical stories in Genesis.  This
article works in three stages.  First, I present a brief history of the
zero-sum mindset and efforts to challenge it in American legal dis-
pute resolution discourse.  Second, I examine several stories from
Genesis in which the zero-sum mindset leads to conflict.  Third, I
conclude with reflections on the importance of raising awareness of
the zero-sum mindset as a step toward both preventing conflicts and
more effectively resolving those that arise.
I. INTRODUCTION
Is it possible for both parties in a conflict to “win,” or for one
party to win, must the other party lose?  Simple though that ques-
tion sounds, its ramifications are far from trivial.  When parties see
conflicts as zero-sum, they are led quite naturally into combative
tactics.  If the parties believe that the only way for one side to get
more is for the other side to get less, then they’d best prepare for
battle.  By contrast, when parties see conflicts as positive-sum, they
tend to look for integrative solutions.  Although there is no single
explanation for the puzzle of why some disputes are resolved ami-
cably while others become destructive affairs, the mindsets that the
* Professor of Law and Associate Director, Institute for Dispute Resolution, University of
Florida Levin College of Law.  I thank Karen Cohen, Robin Davis, Richard Hiers, Shira
Megerman, Leonard Riskin, and Danny Sokol for their helpful suggestions, and Elizabeth
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parties bring to conflicts are undoubtedly very significant factors.1
Note, too, that such mindsets may influence not only how conflicts
unfold, but whether they arise in the first place.  While seeing the
world as zero-sum does not make conflict inevitable, it does make
it more likely.  Where do these mindsets come from?  How deep-
rooted are they?  In this Article, I suggest that, at least within
Western society, the zero-sum mindset has informed our under-
standing of conflict for generations.  More specifically, many of the
most famous Biblical stories in Genesis depict conflict in essentially
zero-sum terms.  This is not to say that such Biblical depictions are
the cause of the zero-sum view of conflict so many take in our
world, but rather that the assumption that for one party to win the
other party must lose has been foundational to the way many peo-
ple, in particular lawyers, have approached conflict for
generations.2
The structure of this article is as follows.  First, I present a
brief history of the zero-sum mindset in American alternative dis-
pute resolution discourse over the past century.  My goal here is
not to be exhaustive, but to provide readers with a short historical
sketch indicating that challenging this mindset has been one of the
central tasks of American dispute resolution teaching and scholar-
ship over the past century.  Second, the heart of the essay turns to
several of the early stories of Genesis, specifically, the three con-
flict narratives of brothers Cain and Abel, Isaac and Ishmael, and
Jacob and Esau.  In these narratives, we see a clear pattern: for one
party to win, the other party must lose.  The zero-sum mindset, in
other words, undergirds these ancient conflict stories.  Although
positive-sum examples exist in Genesis too (and I shall discuss sev-
eral), the zero-sum mindset undergirds these famous sibling con-
flict stories.  Third, I conclude with some reflections about the
importance of raising awareness of the zero-sum mindset as a step
towards better resolving disputes in our world.  My argument is not
what I consider the Pollyannaish one that all conflicts are positive-
sum.  Rather, my claim is that because many parties approach con-
1 An array of forces, including tactical and strategic barriers, psychological, organizational,
and institutional factors, structural incentives, and principal-agent tensions all influence how
conflicts unfold. See STANFORD CENTER ON CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION, BARRIERS TO CON-
FLICT RESOLUTION 3–7 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
2 Let me express at the outset my intellectual debt to Leonard Riskin for his famous cri-
tique of what he dubbed the “standard philosophical map” of lawyers.  As Riskin argued, the
mindsets that lawyers bring to conflicts, frequently including the zero-sum assumption that for
one party to win the other party must lose, are critical to how conflicts unfold. See Leonard
Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 43–44 (1982).
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flicts exclusively through zero-sum lenses, far too often parties fail
to see the positive-sum elements within conflicts.  Accordingly,
awareness of our mindsets is critical if our world is to improve at
processing conflicts constructively.
II. A VERY BRIEF INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
History is a blend of ideas and events, and it is possible to tell
the history of dispute resolution both in terms of the transforma-
tion of institutions and practices and in terms of the spread of
ideas.3  For example, Harvard Law School professor Frank
Sander’s 1976 Pound Conference Lecture, in which he advocated
for a “multi-door courthouse” that would funnel different types of
disputes into different dispute resolution mechanisms (e.g., media-
tion, arbitration, adjudication, etc.), is often seen as a watershed
moment in the institutional development of the alternative dispute
resolution movement.4  However, that lecture was preceded by
Lon Fuller’s seminal jurisprudential writing about process plural-
ism, specifically, his idea that different forms of dispute resolution
were appropriate to different types of disputes.5  When it comes to
addressing the zero-sum mindset, there is, to my knowledge, no
single watershed event, either in the history of institutions or in the
history of practice, demarking the effort to uproot that mindset.
As I describe below, much, though not all, of the effort to tackle
that mindset has been implicit rather than explicit.  Nevertheless,
there can be little doubt that one of the major thrusts of the alter-
native dispute resolution movement over the past several decades
has been trying to shake the hold of the zero-sum mindset.  To see
this, however, it is helpful to first discuss a very closely related con-
cept: integrative bargaining.
Integrative bargaining is the approach of looking for value-
creating ways to “expand the pie” when two parties are negotiat-
ing.  By contrast, distributive bargaining is the value-claiming ap-
proach of trying to obtain a certain slice of the piece, often, but not
3 For overviews of that history, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Inven-
tion: The Intellectual Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (2000); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Roots and Inspirations: A Brief History of the Foundations of Dispute Resolution, in
THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 13 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds.,
2005) [hereinafter Roots and Inspirations].
4 See, e.g., Michael L. Moffitt, Before the Big Bang: The Making of an ADR Pioneer, 22
NEGOT. J. 437, 437–38 (2006).
5 See Roots and Inspirations, supra note 3, at 16–21.
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always, the largest slice one can get.6  Integrative bargaining ex-
plores options and interests, usually in a cooperative tone.  Distrib-
utive bargaining often, but not always, focuses on allocation, with
parties resorting to adversarial tactics such as threats, bluffs, and
positional posturing.  Integrative bargaining and distributive bar-
gaining are approaches to bargaining, while the zero-sum mindset
and positive-sum mindset describe a party’s beliefs about the range
of possible outcomes—whether the pie can be expanded or
whether it is essentially fixed in size.
What is the linkage between these styles of bargaining and the
parties’ mindsets?  One might think of the zero-sum mindset as an
intellectual premise to distributive bargaining, and the positive-
sum mindset as an intellectual premise to integrative bargaining.
As Carrie Menkel-Meadow describes:  “When choosing the adver-
sarial or competitive model, negotiators assume that scarce re-
sources must always be divided and allocated, as in a “zero-sum”
game.  Instead, integrative negotiations (taking account of the real
needs and interests of all parties) can actually lead to “expanded
pies[.]”7”  If one does not believe that the pie can be expanded,
then there is little sense in exploring value-creating options.  If one
does believe that the pie can be expanded, then looking for in-
tegrative ways to expand that pie makes a great deal of sense.
Hence, efforts to promote the use of integrative bargaining can be
seen as implicitly challenging the zero-sum mindset.8
6 I write “but not always” because the task of distributing or allocating a fixed amount need
not inherently be adversarial.  For example, some parties may look toward fair, objective criteria
to determine such allocation. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 81–94 (1991) (advocating principled negotiation using objec-
tive criteria as a means of addressing distributive issues).  Another way to put this is that the
scarcity of resources alone does not make hostilities inevitable.  Some parties divide scarce re-
sources by fighting over who gets the larger share.  Other parties cooperatively agree to a fair
mechanism to determine such allocations.  So, too, the presence of plentiful resources does not
make cooperation inevitable.  There is an allegory told in many cultures of a person who visits
heaven and hell and finds in each place the same thing, namely, people seated around a banquet
table covered with succulent foods, but who have long spoons (or in some versions chopsticks)
attached to their arms, running from their shoulders to their hands, preventing them from bend-
ing at the elbow.  In heaven the people are happy and well-fed, but in hell they are emaciated.
Why the difference?  In heaven, people take turns feeding one another, but in hell they attempt
to feed only themselves. See Allegory of the Long Spoons, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Allegory_of_the_long_spoons (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
7 CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., NEGOTIATION:  PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING
117 (2014).
8 The mathematical language of “zero sum” and “positive sum” comes from the field of
game theory. See, e.g., JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1980).
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In American thought, the integrative approach to bargaining
traces at least to the writings of Mary Parket Follett from the 1920s.
Follett asserted that conflicts were resolved in one of three ways:
(1) domination, in which one party gets its way, (2) compromise, in
which the parties meet in the middle, or (3) integration, where op-
tions are explored that better meet the parties’ underlying inter-
ests.9  The most famous example of integration is likely that of two
sisters fighting over an orange, one wanting the zest for baking and
the other the fruit for eating.10  If they simply fight over who gets
the orange without articulating their underlying interests, it is easy
to imagine them reaching the fair but suboptimal solution of cut-
ting the orange in two, each getting one half.  Yet, if they discuss
their interests (i.e., why they want the orange), the integrative solu-
tion of giving one sister all of the zest and the other sister all of the
fruit is obvious.  All too often, however, people assume that situa-
tions are zero-sum when in fact they are not, a cognitive error so-
cial psychologist have dubbed the “fixed pie” bias.11
Over the past several decades, legal educators have repeatedly
attempted to challenge the zero-sum mindset among law students
and lawyers, suggesting in various ways that legal disputes should
9 See DYNAMIC ADMINISTRATION: THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF MARY PARKER FOLLETT
34–35 (Henry C. Metcalf & L. Urwick eds., 1940); Menkel-Meadow, Roots and Inspiration,
supra note 3, at 15.  Follett was not alone in her use of the term “integration.”  For example,
although he used the term somewhat differently from Follett, Laswell also discussed “integra-
tion.” See H.D. Laswell, Compromise, in 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOC. SCI. 147–48 (Edwin
Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1937).  To the best of my knowledge, the first extended treat-
ment of the integrative bargaining model is that of Walton and McKersie. See RICHARD E.
WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS, chs. 4,
5 (1965).
10 Many know this example from Getting to Yes (see FISHER ET AL., supra note 6, at 56–57);
however, there is some ambiguity about its precise origins. See Deborah M. Kolb, The Love for
Three Oranges Or: What Did We Miss About Ms. Follett in the Library?, 11 NEGOT. J. 339, 339
(1995).
11 I use the general term “fixed-pie” bias loosely, for there are subtleties beyond the scope of
this paper concerning different biases in this area. See generally Max H. Bazerman & Margaret
A. Neale, Heuristics in Negotiation:  Limitations to Effective Dispute Resolution, in NEGOTIAT-
ING IN ORGANIZATIONS 51, 62 (Max H. Bazerman & Roy J. Lewicki eds., 1983) (critiquing the
belief that “all conflicts are of a fixed pie nature”); Leigh Thompson & Reid Hastie, Social
Perception in Negotiation, 47 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 98
(1990) (distinguishing between and empirically examining “fixed sum error” and “incompatibil-
ity error”); Michele J. Gelfand & Sophia Christakopoulou, Culture and Negotiator Cognition:
Judgment Accuracy and Negotiation Processes in Individualistic and Collectivistic Cultures, 79
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 248 (1999) (examining the fixed-pie
error in individualistic American culture versus collectivist Greek culture); THE HANDBOOK OF
NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE 49–51 (Michele J. Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett eds., 2004) (survey-
ing research on culture and the fixed-pie bias).
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not be viewed simply as battles to be won (though some do become
battles) but as problems to be solved—problems to which the solu-
tions are not always zero-sum.12  Even if courtroom trials are typi-
cally winner-take-all, zero-sum affairs,13 legal negotiations need
not be.  As Carrie Menkel-Meadow writes, “While there may be
some paradigmatic zero-sum games in legal negotiations, most are
not zero-sum . . . . [Z]ero-sum games in legal negotiations may be
more the exception than the rule.  Our conceptualization of the
negotiation process ought not to be based on the exceptions.”14
Some works, such as Leonard Riskin’s critique of the lawyer’s
“standard philosophical map,”15 explicitly challenge the zero-sum
mindset.  Even those that don’t do so explicitly often do so implic-
itly by teaching integrative bargaining.  Classic negotiation exer-
cises like “The Oil Pricing Exercise” and “Sally Soprano” from the
Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School are designed to
teach the benefits of cooperation rather than pure competition and
of parties exploring interests rather than becoming locked into
positions.16
12 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984).
13 Even in those few areas of American law, such as in comparative negligence, that embrace
apportioning damages rather than awarding all-or-nothing verdicts (see John E. Coons, Ap-
proaches to Court Imposed Compromise—The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 NW. U. L. REV.
750 (1964) (advocating greater use of apportionment in American law)), the zero-sum assump-
tion is implicit, for one dollar more to one party is still one dollar less to the other party.  Put
differently, apportionment alone does not imply integration.  Integration, by contrast, involves
looking at the parties’ underlying interests, as when a judge in a child custody case creates a
visitation arrangement that factors in the parents’ underlying schedules (e.g., if the father works
weekends and the mother works weekdays, giving the father custody during the weekdays and
the mother custody on the weekends).
14 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 12, at 786–87.
15 Although he does not use the term “zero-sum mindset,” the concept is no doubt present in
Leonard Riskin’s famed critique of the intellectual assumptions that lawyers typically bring to
cases:
The philosophical map employed by most practicing lawyers and law teachers, and dis-
played to the law student—which I will call the lawyer’s standard philosophical map—differs
radically from that which a mediator must use.  What appears on this map is determined largely
by the power of two assumptions about matters that lawyers handle: (1) that disputants are ad-
versaries—i.e., if one wins, the others must lose—and (2) that disputes may be resolved through
application, by a third party, of some general rule of law.
Riskin, supra note 2, at 43–44 (emphasis added).  Leading legal negotiation textbooks, too,
include at least some mention of the zero-sum frame.  For recent examples, see ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: HOW LAWYERS CAN CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DIS-
PUTES 196–98 (2000); CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 7.
16 See respectively Oil Pricing Exercise, PROGRAM ON NEGOTIATION: HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL, http://www.pon.harvard.edu/shop/oil-pricing-exercise-3 (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (a re-
peat play prisoner’s dilemma exercise in which long-term maximization requires cooperative
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Some scholars have criticized the extent to which legal educa-
tion has emphasized integrative negotiation, believing that the
“real world” of legal conflict is a tougher place than such coopera-
tive approaches would suggest.17  Whether or not that criticism is
valid,18 the essential point for the argument here is that teaching
integrative bargaining, often under the label of problem-solving,
has become a staple of dispute resolution instruction by law
schools over the past several decades.  Whether through theoretical
instruction or via role-play exercises, one of the basic lessons is that
the pie is not always fixed, the world is not always zero-sum.  In
short, for roughly the past century, the effort has been underway
both within law schools and elsewhere to teach people that negoti-
ations need not be solely distributive, but that in some negotiations
at least, it is possible for both sides to “win.”  As game theorist and
military strategist Thomas Schelling wrote some fifty years ago:
Pure conflict, in which the interests of the two antagonists are
completely opposed, is a special case . . . .  For this reason, “win-
ning” in a conflict does not have a strictly competitive meaning;
it is not winning relative to one’s adversary.  It means gaining
relative to one’s value system; and this may be done by bargain-
ing, by mutual accommodation, and by the avoidance of mutu-
ally damaging behavior.19
Not all conflicts are zero-sum.  Often one party can “win” without
the other party losing.
behavior); Sally Soprano I, PROGRAM ON NEGOTIATION: HARVARD LAW School, http://www.pon
.harvard.edu/shop/sally-soprano-i/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (an employment contract negotia-
tion with a great range of creative integrative possibilities).  When parties interact repeatedly
with one another over time, the lesson that cooperative rather than purely competitive ap-
proaches can often be beneficial to parities is one of the basic teachings of game theory. See
generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
17 See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 GEO. L.J. 369 (1996);
Charles B. Craver, Negotiation Ethics for Real World Interactions, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 299 (2010).
18 A detailed response to that criticism is beyond the scope of this work, however, I note
both that advocates of integrative negotiation do teach that distribution is a core aspect of nego-
tiation (see, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin et al., The Tension Between Creating and Distributing
Value, in BEYOND WINNING:  NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 11–43
(2000)) and that empirical studies of negotiation by practicing lawyers have found much prob-
lem-solving behavior among legal negotiators (see, e.g., Andrea K. Schneider, Shattering Negoti-
ation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 143 (2002)).
19 THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 4–5 (Harvard Univ. Press ed. 1980).
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III. A ZERO-SUM BIBLICAL FRAME
How old is the framing of conflicts as zero-sum?  At least as
old as the Bible, which is to say, very old indeed.20  From its open-
ing chapters, many Biblical stories present conflicts as essentially
zero-sum affairs.  This is not to say that the Bible never presents
integrative images of conflict, but that right from the start of Gene-
sis, we find multiple stories in which conflicts arise within zero-sum
framings of human relations.21  Below I focus on this pattern in
Genesis stories; however, as Jerome Neyreh and Richard
Rohrbaugh describe so well, the zero-sum motif is common in
20 The origins of the Bible, both in terms of authorship and time of composition, have been a
matter of tremendous debate among scholars.  Most Western Biblical scholars understand the
Pentateuch to be a redacted document drawing upon several antecedent sources, the so-called
“documentary hypothesis.”  For an introduction to that field, see RICHARD ELLIOT FRIEDMAN,
WHO WROTE THE BIBLE? (1987).  As to dating the Pentateuch, states Prof. Marc Zvi Brettler,
“The ultimate result of this redaction [was] most likely completed during the Babylonian exile
(586–538 BCE) or soon thereafter in the early Persian period.”  Marc Zvi Brettler, Torah: Ter-
minology, Contents, and Traditional Views of Authorship, in THE JEWISH STUDY BIBLE 1, 6
(Adele Berlin & Marc Zvi Brettler, eds., 1999).
21 Within Jewish tradition, even the very creation of the world depicted at the beginning of
Genesis has been associated with the zero-sum framing of conflict.  The Bible, of course, begins
with a story of the world’s creation, with the first verse variously translated as, “In the beginning,
God created the heavens and the earth . . .” or “When God began creating the heavens and the
earth . . .”).  In his opening comment on the first verse of Genesis, the most famous of all Jewish
Biblical commentators, the eleventh-century, French Rabbi Sholmo Yitzchaki of Troyes (com-
monly known by the acronym “Rashi”) begins by asking an unusual question:  Why does the
Bible (whose first five books Jewish tradition calls the “Torah”)—a book Jewish tradition under-
stood in large part as a legal text (i.e., the laws God gave to Israel)—begin with the story of
creation rather than with the first legal commandment concerning the dating of months found in
Exodus 12:2?  Why, in other words, did not the Bible start with the first law?  (I describe this
question as “unusual” as I suspect that for most readers starting with a history of the world’s
creation seems a natural place for a historical, narrative text to begin.)  Rashi answers as follows:
It was not necessary to begin the Torah [whose main object is to teach commandments,
mitzvoth, with this verse] but from “This month shall be unto you” [the beginning of months]
(Ex. 12.2), since this is the first mitzvah [commandment] that Israel was commanded [to ob-
serve].  And what is the reason that it begins with Genesis?  Because of [the verse] “The power
of His works He hath declared to His people in giving them the heritage of the nations “(Ps.
111.6).  For if the nations of the world should say to Israel:  “You are robbers, because you have
seized by force the lands of the seven nations [of Canaan] they [Israel] could say to them, “The
entire world belongs to the Holy One, Blessed Be He, He created it and gave it to whomever it
was right in his eyes.”
ABRAHAM BEN ISAIAH & BENJAMIN SHARFMAN ET AL., THE PENTATEUCH AND RASHI’S
COMMENTARY: A LINEAR TRANSLATION INTO ENGLISH: GENESIS 1 (1976).
According to Rashi, Genesis begins with God’s creation of the world because in the future
people will be fighting over who has the right to which piece of land.  The world, in other words,
is a zero-sum one with various peoples fighting over who will control what land.  Sadly, that fight
continues to this day.
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many other parts of the Hebrew Bible, Christian Scriptures, and
other writings from the ancient world.22
Though it might be claimed that the first conflict between
humans in the Bible occurs in the third chapter of Genesis when
Adam blames Eve for his eating of the forbidden fruit (an act
evincing a zero-sum mindset—I if one of us must be at fault, it is
she, not me!),23 the first indisputable conflict between Biblical
characters occurs in the fourth chapter of Genesis with Cain’s mur-
der of Abel.  As we read:
Now the man [Adam] knew his wife Eve, and she conceived and
bore Cain, saying, “I have gained a male child with the help of
the Lord.”  She then bore his brother Abel.  Abel became a
keeper of sheep, and Cain became a tiller of the soil.  In the
course of time, Cain brought an offering to the Lord from the
fruit of his soil; and Abel, for his part, brought the choicest of
the firstlings of his flock.  The Lord paid heed to Abel and his
offering, but to Cain and his offering He paid no heed.  Cain was
much distressed and his face fell. . . . [Sometime thereafter]
when they were in the field, Cain set upon his brother Abel and
killed him.24
Why does Cain murder his brother Abel?  One factor is that within
this story, God’s approval seems to have a comparative, zero-sum
quality.  The Bible describes Abel offering from the “choicest” of
his firstlings, but with Cain’s offering, there is no such praise.
God’s paying heed to Abel’s offering goes hand in hand with his
disregarding of Cain’s offering.  Could both brothers’ offerings
have been accepted?  We don’t know for sure, but the zero-sum
flavor of the story is very strong.  Cain’s jealousy, too, is a factor in
the story, but without what seems like the zero-sum backdrop of
scarce Divine acceptance, that jealousy would not have arisen.  As
with sibling relationships to this day, both the differential treat-
ment of children by parents and the scarcity of love in the home
22 Jerome H. Neyrey & Richard L. Rohrbaugh, “He Must Increase, I Must Decrease” (John
3:30): A Cultural and Social Interpretation, 63 THE CATHOLIC BIBLICAL QUARTERLY 464, 468–76
(2001).  In the Bible, zero-sum thinking is employed not only by human characters, but by God
as well.  Consider, example, God’s statement to Gideon in Judges 7:2 in which God appears
concerned that His stature might be diminished if Israel’s stature increases (“The people that are
with thee are too many for Me to give the Midianites into their hand, lest Israel vaunt them-
selves against Me, saying: mine own hand hath saved me.”).
23 Gen. 3:12.  Biblical quotations are from THE TORAH: THE FIVE BOOKS OF MOSES (Jewish
Publication Society trans., 2d ed. 1978).
24 Gen. 4:1–8.
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are recipes for sibling rivalry.25  Indeed, scarcity is a foundational
premise of many Biblical stories,26 scarcity not only of parental
love and Divine acceptance, but physical resources such as land
and food, and social resources such as honor, rank, and status.27
That linkage between zero-sum thinking and conflict continues
in the subsequent inheritance and birthright stories of the half-
brothers, Isaac and Ishmael, and the full brothers, Jacob and Esau.
Let us start with the first narrative.  To recall, Isaac is Abraham’s
younger son by his first wife Sarah, and Ishmael is Abraham’s
older son by his second wife Hagar, the maid-servant Sarah gave to
Abraham to take as a wife when she, Sarah, had not yet conceived.
As the boys grow, Sarah’s jealousy arises:
Sarah saw the son, whom Hagar the Egyptian had borne to
Abraham, playing.  She said to Abraham, “Cast out that slave-
woman [Hagar] and her son [Ishmael], for the son of that slave
shall not share in the inheritance with my son Isaac.”  The mat-
ter distressed Abraham greatly, for it concerned a son of his[,
Ishmael].  But God said to Abraham, “Do not be distressed over
the boy [Ishmael] or the slave [Hagar]; whatever Sarah tells you,
do as she says, for it is through Isaac that offspring shall be con-
tinued for you.  As for the son of the slave-woman, I will make a
nation of him, too, for he is your seed.”28
25 On the psychological effects of differential treatment of children by parents, see Gene H.
Brody, Sibling Relationship Quality: Its Causes and Consequences, ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 2, 7
(1998); Amy J. Rauer and Brenda L. Volling, Differential Parenting and Sibling Jealousy: Devel-
opmental Correlates of Young Adults’ Romantic Relationships, 14 PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS
495, 498 (2007); Per T. Smiseth et al., Interaction Between Parental Care and Sibling Competition:
Parents Enhance Offspring Growth and Exacerbate Sibling Competition, 61 EVOLUTION 2331,
2337 (2007).  On the scarcity of parental love producing sibling conflict within Biblical narra-
tives, see REGINA M. SCHWARTZ, THE CURSE OF CAIN: THE VIOLENT LEGACY OF MONOTHEISM
1-4, 115–16 (1997); STEPHEN R. HAYNES, NOAH’S CURSE: THE BIBLICAL JUSTIFICATION OF
AMERICAN SLAVERY 210 (2002).  The Biblical motif of limited parental love and ensuing sibling
rivalry is consistent with anthropologist George Foster’s claim discussed below of the workings
of peasant societies adhering to the belief that all goods (not just land) are in limited supply. See
George Foster, Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good, infra note 53, at 298–99.
26 As Regina Schwartz observes, a scarcity framework underlies not only many of these sib-
ling rivalry stories, but many of the larger scale conflicts in the Bible as well.  As she describes:
When everything is in short supply, it must all be competed for—land, prosperity, power,
favor, even identity itself.  In many biblical narratives, the one God is not imagined as infinitely
giving, but as strangely withholding.  Everyone does not receive divine blessings.  Some are
cursed—with dearth and death—as though there were a cosmic shortage of prosperity.
SCHWARTZ, THE CURSE OF CAIN, supra note 25, at xi.  The Bible does present counterex-
amples in which plentitude, rather than scarcity, frames certain stories; however, in Schwartz’s
view, the rule of scarcity is the dominant motif. Id. at 118–19.
27 Neyrey & Rohrbaugh, supra note 22, at 469–76.
28 Gen. 21:9–13.
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Admittedly the framing here is not completely zero-sum, for in the
last sentence above, God promises to make a nation out of Ish-
mael’s descendants as well.  Still, the zero-sum flavor of the story is
very strong. Either Isaac or Ishmael is to receive the inheritance
from Abraham—they are not, as Sarah puts it, to share that inheri-
tance together.  In Sarah’s eyes at least, Ishmael and his mother
Hagar must be cast aside so that her son Isaac can inherit.
The conflict narratives about the twin brothers Jacob and Esau
have perhaps the clearest zero-sum framing to them.  From the
time of their conception, the Bible depicts these twins as struggling
against one another in Rebekah’s womb.29  Rebekah asks God why
they struggle so, and God replies, “Two nations are in your womb,
Two separate peoples shall issue from your body; One people shall
be mightier than the other, and the older shall serve the
younger.”30  In the future, the brothers’ descendants will inhabit a
zero-sum world in which one group must serve the other—they are
not to be equals—and the brothers’ fighting starts even in utero.
The ensuing stories in which Jacob obtains Esau’s first-born,
inheritance birthright and then later their father Isaac’s blessing re-
inforce this picture of a zero-sum world producing sibling conflict.
First comes the birthright story in which Jacob exploits his
brother’s hunger, trading him a bowl of stew in exchange for
Esau’s first-born birthright.31  Several chapters later comes the
“masquerade” story in which, with their mother Rebekah’s help,
Jacob tricks their old, dim-eyed father Isaac into giving him Esau’s
blessing.32  I won’t relay these well-known stories in detail here,
however, the denouement of the second tale is worth highlighting.
No sooner had Jacob left the presence of his father Isaac than Esau
arrives seeking his blessing.33  When Isaac tells him that he has be-
stowed the blessing upon Jacob, Esau bursts into wild and bitter
sobbing and implores Isaac, “Bless me too, Father!”34  At first,
Isaac refuses, explaining that, “Your bother [Jacob] came with guile
29 Gen. 25:22.
30 Gen. 25:23.
31 Gen. 25:29-34.
32 Gen. 27:1–29.  Whether Isaac actually was deceived or whether he was playing along with
Jacob’s ruse is, of course, a matter of debate.  The text suggests that Isaac was unaware of the
original ruse for later he begins trembling violently when Esau informs him that he has been
deceived. Gen. 27:33.  However, clearly Isaac was suspicious that it was Jacob masquerading as
Esau whom he originally blessed, for before administering that blessing Isaac wonders, “The
voice is the voice of Jacob, yet the hands are the hands of Esau.” Gen. 27:22.
33 Gen. 27:30–31.
34 Gen. 27:34.  Technically, the birthright and the blessing were not identical.  The birthright
included Esau’s first-born inheritance rights, but the blessing did not govern inheritance per se.
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and took away your blessing.”35  The world, again, is a zero-sum
one:  the innermost blessing can be given to only one son, not both.
When Esau persists (“Have you but one blessing Father?”36), Jacob
offers a second blessing, but this second blessing is as much a curse
as a blessing, stating that, among other things, Esau “shall serve his
brother.”37  Esau’s anger from all of this is so great that he resolves
to kill Jacob, and their mother Rebekah cautions Jacob to flee their
home.38  As with the earlier Cain and Abel story, the impulse to-
ward violence and the zero-sum framing of the world are again
deeply linked.
Observe that within the Bible’s zero-sum world, matters such
as love and loyalty take on a deeply comparative quality.  What
does it mean to love someone?  It means to love them more than
someone else.  For example, Jacob’s love for Rachel is described in
comparative terms: though both Rachel and Leah become his
wives, the text repeatedly reminds us that he loved Rachel more
than he loved Leah.39  So, too, the Bible frames loyalty compara-
tively.  What does it mean to be loyal to someone?  It means to be
more devoted to them than to someone else.  How do we know
that Abraham is loyal to God?  Because he is willing to sacrifice his
only son Isaac, whom he loves, because God so instructs him.40  In-
deed, much of the book of Exodus can be understood in such
terms.  Who should the children of Israel serve?  Either God or
Pharoah, but not both.41
Does the Bible always present conflicts as zero-sum?  No.
Sometimes parties do reconcile.  For example, some twenty years
after fleeing their home lest Esau kill him, Jacob and Esau recon-
cile.42  Further, sometimes the Bible does present integrative, alter-
35 Gen. 27:35.
36 Gen. 27:38.
37 Gen. 27:39.
38 Gen. 27:41–42.
39 See Gen. 29:16–18 (“Now Laban had two daughters; the name of the older one was Leah,
and the name of the younger was Rachel.  Leah had weak eyes; Rachel was shapely and beauti-
ful.  Jacob loved Rachel[.]”); Gen. 29:30 (“[Jacob] loved Rachel more than Leah.”).
40 Gen. 22:1–12 (“For now I know that you fear God, since you have not withheld your son,
your favored one, from me.).
41 The possibility of serving both Pharaoh and God is raised toward the beginning of the
Exodus narrative, when Moses requests that Pharoah permit the Israelites undertake a three-day
sojourn to make sacrifices to their God.  Pharoah rejects that possibility, imposing harsher work-
ing conditions on the Israelites. Ex. 5: 1–20.  Loyalty is essentially portrayed as binary, not to be
divided.  So, too, with the story of Korah’s rebellion. Num. 16.
42 See Gen. 33.
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native solutions to what appear zero-sum problems.43  Consider
two other examples from Genesis: Abraham’s bargaining with God
over the fate of Sodom and Reuben’s interventions to save the life
of his brother Joseph from death at the hands of their other
brothers.
The negotiation between Abraham and God over the fate of
Sodom has a very positional flavor; however, at a deeper level it
may be understood as a win-win exchange.  “What if there are fifty
righteous people?” Abraham asks God, “Will you sweep away the
righteous with the wicked?”44  What if there are forty-five? forty?
thirty? twenty? ten?  On its surface, the exchange echoes the trope
of many linear, win-lose bargains, with Abraham bargaining with
God over the minimum number of righteous individuals, much like
how people often bargain over the price of an item.  Yet the case
can be made that beneath the surface, this is a win-win exchange in
which multiple options are proposed to find an outcome that better
serves the parties’ underlying interests.45  God wins by becoming
more just, making it less likely that he will punish innocent citizens
of Sodom along with guilty ones.  The innocent citizens of Sodom
win by decreasing the chance that they will be (wrongfully) de-
stroyed.  Although other readings of the text are certainly possible,
the story is suggestive at least of the idea that two parties involved
in a conflict can come out ahead.
Reuben’s interventions to prevent Joseph’s death at the hands
of their brothers is an even clearer example of a win-win exchange.
At first, the brothers plot to kill Joseph for what one might call
zero-sum reasons: they are jealous that their father Israel loves Jo-
seph more than them (here, again, love is portrayed compara-
tively),46 giving him alone a coat of many colors, and they are
resentful of the prophetic dreams that Joseph has (naively) relayed
to them, dreams portending that Joseph will rule over them in the
future.47  Initially, the brothers scheme to slaughter Joseph,48 yet,
43 In the Bible, as in life, some integrative bargaining occurs not in the context of conflict but
of transactional deal making.  For example, when Abraham purchases the Machpelah cave from
Ephron the Hittite so as to have a place to bury his deceased with Sarah (Gen. 23), it seems fair
to presume that the transaction makes both parties (Abraham and Ephron) better off.  Ronald
T. Hyman, Abraham as Negotiator: Guidelines for Persuasive Talk, 69 J. JEWISH EDUC. 9, 10–13
(2004).
44 Gen. 18:23–24.
45 Hyman, supra note 43, at 13.
46 See Gen. 37:3–4 (“Now Israel loved Joseph best of all his sons, for he was the child of his
old age; and he made for him an ornamented tunic [coat of many colors].  And when his brothers
saw that their father loved him more than any of his brothers, they hated him[.]”).
47 Gen. 37:3–11.
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as we know, Joseph is saved from death.  How does this occur?
Reuben suggests that rather than directly shedding Joseph’s blood,
they cast him into a pit, saving his brothers from directly shedding
Joseph’s blood and keeping Joseph alive, at least temporarily.49
Soon thereafter, the brothers spot a caravan en route to Egypt ap-
proaching, and Judah offers the integrative, creative solution of
selling Joseph into slavery.  “What do we gain by killing our
brother and covering up his blood?” he asks.  “Come, let us sell
him to the Ishmaelites, but let us not do away with him ourselves.
After all, he is our brother, our own flesh.”50  The brothers agree,
and Joseph’s life is spared.  The brothers’ interest in getting Joseph
out of their lives is met for he will be a slave in Egypt, sparing the
brothers from the grisly task of killing Joseph themselves.  Joseph,
of course, is better off alive than dead.  Judah, in other words, of-
fers a “win-win” solution:  rather than the outcome being a dead
Joseph murdered by brothers, the outcome is a disposed-of-but-
living Joseph, whom his brothers did not actually kill.  Unlike the
other sibling conflict stories discussed above, in this “win-win” ex-
ample, the Bible’s implicit frame is not zero-sum but positive-sum.
IV. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
The linkage between the zero-sum mindset and the adversarial
approach to conflict is ancient.  In many Biblical stories, conflicts
are depicted in essentially zero-sum terms.  From the small scale
familial conflicts of Genesis to the large scale clashes such as that
between God and Pharoah in Exodus or the later conquest of the
land of Israel, conflict stories replete with zero-sum framings and
jealous combatants are a central Biblical motif.
Why does the Bible do this?  For those who accept the Bible
as history, the answer is that this is how history unfolded.  Many
conflicts in our world both then and now are zero-sum, and the
Bible is simply reflecting this.  Other readers might point to the
cultural context in which the Bible was produced.  Research over
the past several decades has explored the important role that cul-
48 Gen. 37:18–20.
49 Gen. 37:21–22.
50 Gen. 37:26–27.
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ture plays in conflict,51 including how culture influences the mind-
sets (i.e., are conflicts zero-sum or positive-sum) that parties bring
to conflicts.52  These stories were produced in ancient agrarian cul-
tures.  Might such peasant societies built upon the limited land re-
sources be especially prone to zero-sum worldviews?53  For other
readers, the Bible’s religious nature may actually help explain the
prevalence of so many zero-sum framings.  Many religions, after all,
view their path as the (not a) correct one and other paths as incor-
rect ones.  As Kirster Stendahl, former Dean of Harvard Divinity
School and retired Bishop of Stockholm, wrote in a critique of the
prevalence of religious supersessionism (i.e., the claim that a new
religion has superseded an older one), “[W]e are heirs to traditions
that have—it seems—in their very structure the negation if not the
demonization of the Other.”54  Indeed, in Robert Wright’s view,
overcoming zero-sum thinking, both within religious thought and
elsewhere, forms a central challenge of our era.55
51 See, e.g., Kevin Avruch & Peter W. Black, The Culture Question and Conflict Resolution,
16 PEACE & CHANGE 22 (1991); Jeanne M. Brett, Culture and Negotiation, 35 INT’L J. OF
PSYCHOL. 97 (2000); THE HANDBOOK OF NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE, supra note 11, at 53.
52 Gelfand & Christakopoulou, Culture and Negotiator Cognition, supra note 11; Jeswald W.
Salacuse, Ten Ways that Culture Affects Negotiating Style: Some Survey Results, 14 NEGOT. J.
221, 227–28 (1998) (finding levels of win-win and win-lose attitudes among negotiators from
different countries).
53 Neyrey and Rohrbaugh, drawing upon the work of anthropologist George M. Foster, put
much emphasis on the agrarian roots of these Biblical stories.  Neyrey & Rohrbaugh, supra note
22, at 467-81. See also Anselm C. Hagedorn & Jerome H. Neyrey, ‘It Was Out of Envy That
They Handed Jesus Over’ (Mark 15.10): The Anatomy of Envy and the Gospel of Mark, 20 J.
STUD. NEW TESTAMENT 15, 20–25 (1998).  Foster described an anthropological pattern of many
peasant societies built are the “Image of Limited Good” (roughly, the zero-sum assumption) in
which fundamentally-limited agricultural production went hand in hand with a zero-sum cultural
orientation.  Wrote Foster:
By “Image of Limited Good” I mean that broad areas of peasant behavior are patterned in
such fashion as to suggest that peasants view their social, economic, and natural universes—their
total environment—as one in which all of the desired things in life such as land, wealth, health,
friendship and love, manliness and honor, respect and status, power and influence, security and
safety, exist in finite quantity and are always in short supply . . . . Consequently, there is a primary
corollary to The Image of Limited Good:  if “Good” exists in limited amounts which cannot be
expanded, and if the system is closed, it follows that an individual or a family can improve a
position only at the expense of others.
George M. Foster, Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good, 67 AMERICAN ANTHRO-
POLOGIST 293, 296–97 (1965). See also George M. Foster, Interpersonal Relations in Peasant
Society, 19 HUM. ORG. 174 (1960); George M. Foster, Cultural Responses to Expressions of Envy
in Tzintzuntzan, 21 SW. J. OF ANTHROPOLOGY 24 (1965).  A fine example of this pattern is found
in Genesis 13: 6-7, where a conflict arises between Abram’s herdsmen and Lot’s herdsmen be-
cause a single area of land cannot support the grazing needs their combined cattle.
54 Krister Stendahl, Qumran and Supersessionism—and the Road Not Taken, 19 PRINCETON
SEMINARY BULL. 4, 134 (1998).
55 Asserts Wright:
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The literary drama that zero-sum conflicts provide offers an-
other explanation for their prevalence in the Bible.  Like court-
room trials, zero-sum conflicts produce an inherent dramatic
tension: who will win and who will lose?  Zero-sum conflicts work
well for exploring subjects such as jealousy and loyalty and for tell-
ing moral tales of good versus evil.56  Indeed, a nutshell version of
the Bible might go like this: a conflict arises between two parties, a
winner prevails, and the Biblical storyline follows the winner.
We see the literary structure of a zero-sum conflict used in
many contemporary books as well.  In the best-selling children’s
series, Harry Potter and The Hunger Games, zero-sum framings lie
at the core of the conflicts.  In Harry’s battle against the evil Lord
Voldemort, it is prophesized that, “[E]ither must die at the hand of
the other for neither can live while the other survives.”57  In the
dystopian Hunger Games, the rule of the televised spectacle was to
kill or be killed; as with the ancient Roman gladiators, the games
were a battle to the death.58  Beginning with the Bible and continu-
ing to this day, zero-sum conflicts make for powerful drama.  Sto-
[W]e’ve reached a stage in history where the movement toward moral truth has to become
globally momentous.  Technology has made the planet too small, to finely interdependent, for
enmity between large blocs to be in their enduring interest.  The negative-sum side of the world’s
non-zero-sumness is too explosively big to be compatible with social salvation.  In particular:  in
any envisioned “clash of civilizations” between Islam and the West, neither side can realistically
hope for conquest.
So if the God of the Abrahamic faiths is to keep doing what he has often managed to do
before—evolve in a way that fosters positive-sum outcomes of non-zero-sum games—he has
some growing to do.
ROBERT WRIGHT, THE EVOLUTION OF GOD 436–37 (2009). See also Robert Wright, NON-
ZERO:  THE LOGIC OF HUMAN DESTINY (2000) (depicting the rise of non-zero-sum dynamics as
a central force in human history).
56 Such zero-sum, moral tales often have a simplistic quality to them.  As with many chil-
dren’s stories, frequently the “good” characters are all or mostly good and the “bad” characters
are all or mostly evil.  Nevertheless, the stories can be quite gripping, as the reader identifies
with the moral hero battling an evil foe or otherwise being tested.
57 J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE ORDER OF THE PHOENIX 841 (2003).
58 SUZANNE COLLINS, THE HUNGER GAMES 18 (2008) (“The rules of the Hunger Games are
simple . . . . The twenty-four [competitors] will be imprisoned in a vast outdoor arena . . . [and
over] a period of several weeks, the competitors must fight to the death.  The last [competitor]
standing wins.”).  While the Hunger Games series does make use of the zero-sum-game motif, its
heroine Katniss can be understood as challenging that zero-sum game and, more broadly, the
social structure.  Not only does she find a way to circumvent the games’ ordinary rules and have
two contestants survive (both she and her friend Peeta (Id. at 344–45)), but author Collins sug-
gests that challenging the zero-sum structure of the games was central to Katniss’s heroism. See
SUZANNE COLLINS, CATCHING FIRE 19 (2008) (“All I [Katniss] was doing was trying to keep
Peeta and myself alive.  Any act of rebellion was purely coincidental.  But when the Capitol
decrees that only one tribute can live and you have the audacity to challenge it, I guess that’s a
rebellion in itself.”).
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ries teach us many messages.  Some of those messages, like the
narrative storyline, are explicit.  Some of those messages, like the
structures framing the storyline, are implicit.  At least in Genesis,
one of the Bible’s most significant implicit messages is that con-
flicts are often zero-sum affairs.
Does this mean that the zero-sum mindset cannot be changed?
Changing the assumptions that people bring to social interactions is
not simple, but it is not impossible either.  As described above, le-
gal educators specializing in dispute resolution have been challeng-
ing this mindset for decades, as have many beyond the legal
academy.  Does this mean that the goal should be (what I consider
the Pollyannaish one) of getting people to believe that zero-sum
situations never exist?  No.  Some situations are no doubt zero-sum
ones, and seeing those situations realistically makes sense.  That
being said, many conflicts have both zero-sum and positive sum
elements—that is what makes them complex.59  In my view, the
goal should be to help people, including lawyers, move beyond the
zero-sum-only mindset.  When situations are not zero-sum, parties
and their representatives need a grasp of the negotiation skills, in-
cluding the communication skills, needed to reach good solutions.
Most of us know how to argue, but do we also know how to
listen?60
Many people, of course, never realize that conflicts can be
positive-sum: they simply assume that for one party to win, the
other must lose.  An interesting example comes from the second
edition of Thomas Schelling’s seminal work, The Strategy of Con-
flict (for which he, in part, later won the Nobel Prize).  Writes
Schelling:
[The first edition of The Strategy of Conflict] has had a good
reception, and many have cheered me by telling me that they
liked it or learned from it.  But the response that warms me
most after twenty years is the late John Strachey’s.  John
Strachey, whose books I read in college, had been an outstand-
ing Marxist economist in the 1930s.  After the war he had been
defense minister in Britain’s Labor Government.  Some of us at
59 See generally Jonathan R. Cohen, Adversaries? Partners?  How About Counterparts?  On
Metaphors in the Practice and Teaching of Negotiation and Dispute Resolution, 20 CONFLICT
RESOL. Q. 433 (2003).
60 On the need to foster a culture of dialogue rather than debate generally, see DEBORAH
TANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTURE:  FROM DEBATE TO DIALOGUE (1988).  On the importance
of listening in conflict resolution specifically, see Robert H. Mnookin et al., The Tension between
Empathy and Assertiveness, 12 NEGOT. J. 217 (1996); Jonathan R. Cohen, Open-Minded Listen-
ing, 5 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 139 (2014).
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Harvard’s Center for International Affairs invited him to visit
because he was writing a book on disarmament and arms con-
trol.  When he called on me he exclaimed how much this book
had done for his thinking, and as he talked with enthusiasm I
tried to guess which of my sophisticated ideas in which chapters
had made so much difference to him.  It turned out it wasn’t any
particular idea in any particular chapter.  Until he read this
book, he simply had not comprehended that an inherently non-
zero-sum conflict could exist.61
Until it was pointed out to him, Strachey never realized that non-
zero-sum conflicts could exist.  At one level, that may sound hu-
morous, but at another level, it shows how terribly important fos-
tering awareness of the zero-sum mindset is.  That a former
defense minister of the British government never understood that
conflicts could have positive-sum elements is a grave situation.  In-
deed, while the faces of those in power have changed with the pass-
ing of time, the mindset of many behind those faces may well
remain the same.
Changing how people perceive the world is far from easy, but
it is very important.  The mindsets people hold may influence not
only how they respond once a conflict has arisen (e.g., whether
they will use adversarial approaches geared toward distribution or
cooperative approaches geared toward integration), but also
whether conflicts arise in the first place.  Put differently, zero-sum
beliefs about the world may both generate conflict and may also
impact conflict resolution.  Sometimes parties’ beliefs about the
world may act like self-fulfilling prophecies: when they believe the
world is zero-sum rather than positive-sum, they become more dis-
trustful, which in turn makes combat more likely, which in turn
reinforces their zero-sum mindsets, and so on—a vicious cycle, so
to speak.  Raising awareness of the zero-sum mindset may help in
resolving conflicts more cooperatively and also in preventing some
conflicts from arising in the first place.  This is not to say that zero-
sum situations never exist, but perhaps that they are more rare
than parties tend to think.  If so, to see more peace in our outer
world, we would do well to consider our inner mindsets.
61 SCHELLING, supra note 19, at vi.
